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•JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from portions of the final Judgment of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court following the trial of all issues 
to the Court. Judgment was entered on the 29th day of October, 
1987. Notice of Appeal was filed with the Clerk of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court on the 27th day of November, 1987. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
from the final Order of the Seventh Judicial District Court 
pursuant to §78-2-2 (3) (i) , Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Lower Court err in ruling that the Respondent 
was not estopped from placing the right-of-way of Cedar Hills 
Drive ten feet (10') to twelve feet (12') from the foundation of 
Appellants' home despite Respondent's earlier representations 
that the right-of-way was thirty-one feet (31') to thirty-five 
feet (35') away from Appellants1 home? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Appellants 
had trespassed upon the right-of-way of the Respondent and in 
assessing damages therefor? 
3. Did the Trial Court err in failing to terminate the 
easement of the City along 300 North Street for purposes of 
maintenance? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are the owners of a residence, dental office and 
other real property situated within the City limits of the City 
of Price and located generally in the area of two City streets 
known as 300 North Street and Cedar Hills Drive. This appeal 
deals with claims made against the City by reason of the align-
ment and construction of the above-named City streets. 
The original Complaint of the Plaintiffs (R. 1) sought 
relief in three (3) separate areas, generally identified as 
follows: 
A. First Claim for Relief. Estoppel against the 
City with regards to the location of the right-of-way 
of Cedar Hills Drive as it adjoins the residence and 
dental office property of the Plaintiffs. (R. 8). 
B. Second Claim for Relief. The right of the 
City to appeal a Board of Adjustment decision granting 
to Plaintiffs a variance as to the heighth of a fence 
to be constructed on their property. 
C. Third Claim for Relief. Termination of an 
easement held by the City along the northern boundary 
of Plaintiffs1 property as it adjoins 300 North Street. 
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the City as to the First 
and Third Claims for Relief. The Trial Court also ruled in favor 
of the City as to a portion of its Counterclaim for damages for 
-2-
trespass• It is from these rulings only that Plaintiffs bring 
this Appeal, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs purchased their property, consisting of a 
27-acre parcel in 1977. At the time of the purchase the City 
Street known as Cedar Hills Drive traversed a portion of Plain-
tiffs1 property and was improved with a hard asphalt surface. 
(Tr. 9-11.) However, the City street now known as 300 North did 
not exist and had not been constructed. 
2. At the time of their purchase, Plaintiffs intended to 
build a home and dental office on a portion of the property. In 
order to do so, Plaintiffs inquired of various City personnel as 
to the procedure to be followed in obtaining a building permit 
for such construction. (Tr. 14.) Plaintiffs made these in-
quiries of Mr. Lynn Ockey who was, at that time, the City Build-
ing Inspector and of Mr. John Huefner, who was the City Engineer. 
(Tr. 13-14.) 
3. In response to the inquiries of Plaintiffs, Mr. Huefner 
represented that in order to obtain a building permit, Plaintiffs 
would have to designate an area of the property as their building 
lot. Mr. Huefner further informed the Plaintiffs that since 
Cedar Hills Drive was a limited access road, Plaintiffs' home and 
dental office would need to face, and have access to and from, a 
street other than Cedar Hills Drive. Plaintiffs were advised 
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that it would be necessary to construct a city street which 
connected to Cedar Hills Drive for the purpose of gaining access 
to the home and dental office. (Tr. 14.) 
4. Ultimately, Mr. Huefner suggested that Plaintiffs 
construct their home and dental office in the northeast quadrant 
of their property at the intersection of what is now 30 0 North 
Street and Cedar Hills Drive. In conjunction with that desig-
nation, Plaintiffs were advised by Mr. Huefner that, as a condi-
tion to obtaining a building permit, Plaintiffs would be required 
to dedicate a portion of their property along their northern 
boundary to the City for the purpose of constructing 300 North 
Street. (Tr. 16.) 
5. After Plaintiffs agreed to the placement of their home 
and dental office in the area described above, Mr. Huefner, the 
City Engineer, prepared written legal descriptions of both the 
building lot where Plaintiffs' home would be constructed as well 
as a parcel of property approximately one hundred seventy feet 
(170') by thirty feet (30') which was to be dedicated to the City 
for the sole purpose of constructing 300 North Street. (Tr. 18; 
Exh. 2.) 
6. Plaintiffs were then told by Mr. Huefner that in order 
to get a building permit they would need to produce a "plot plan" 
or a drawing showing the location of the improvements in relation 
to the City streets of Cedar Hills Drive and 300 North. In 
conjunction with this information, Mr. Huefner informed the 
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Plaintiffs that the required setback from Cedar Hills Drive and 
from 300 North was thirty feet (30'). Plaintiffs decided that in 
order to be in compliance with the setback requirements, they 
would place their home and dental office thirty-five feet (351) 
from Cedar Hills and fifty feet (50f) from 300 North Street. 
(Tr. 21-27; Exh. 3.) 
7. At the time Mr. Huefner, as the City Engineer, discussed 
with Plaintiffs the setback requirements and the requirements of 
the plot plan, Mr. Huefner indicated to Plaintiffs that the 
dedicated right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive was sixty-six feet 
(661) wide. This measurement was placed on a draft plot plan 
prepared by Mr. Huefner. (Tr. 27.) In fact, the dedicated 
right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive was eighty feet (80') wide. 
Plaintiffs were advised to rely upon the sixty-six foot (66f) 
measurement by Mr. Huefner. (Tr. 28.) 
8. After Plaintiffs received a building permit, they 
retained an excavator for the purpose of digging the basement and 
foundation for the home and dental office. However, before such 
excavation could commence, Plaintiffs were advised that it would 
be necessary for the City Engineer to place wooden markers on the 
property showing the required setback from both 300 North and 
Cedar Hills Drive. This would ensure that the building, once 
constructed, did not violate the setback requirements. 
9. At the request of Plaintiffs, the City Engineer, John 
Huefner, placed stakes on the property showing the required 
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setback at thirty feet (30') from the right-of-way line of Cedar 
Hills Drive and 300 North, (Tr. 326-28.) Mr. Huefner stated 
that he measured the thirty foot (30') distance on Cedar Hills 
Drive from the eighty foot (80') right-of-way line as opposed to 
the sixty-six foot (66') right-of-way line. (Tr. 330.) 
10. In reliance upon the stakes places on the property by 
the City Engineer, Plaintiffs caused their residence and real 
property to be constructed, placing the building at a distance of 
approximately thirty-five feet (35') from the right-of-way line 
of Cedar Hills Drive and well beyond the setback line marked by 
Mr. Huefner. Plaintiffs thereafter believed that their property 
was beyond thirty feet (30') from the right-of-way line of Cedar 
Hills Drive. (Tr. 63.) 
11. After the home and dental office were substantially 
constructed, Plaintiffs and the City became involved in a dispute 
regarding the construction and elevation of 3 00 North Street. 
Because of the elevation at which 300 North Street was construct-
ed, Plaintiffs were denied access to their garage. As a part of 
the resolution of that dispute, the City agreed to allow Plain-
tiffs to construct a garage which would have direct access to 
Cedar Hills Drive. The Plaintiffs constructed the garage facili-
ty, but did not immediately construct the driveway which would 
connect directly onto Cedar Hills Drive. (Tr. 69.) 
12. Further in conjunction with the settlement of the 
dispute, the City returned to Plaintiffs the property which 
-6-
Plaintiffs had originally dedicated to the City for the purpose 
of constructing 300 North Street. This was done for the reason 
that the City had discovered that the asphalt surface of 300 
North had not been constructed upon the parcel dedicated by 
Plaintiffs, but had been constructed totally upon adjoining 
property which had been dedicated for the same purpose. However, 
the parties agreed that because there was a substantial slope 
from the road surface to the edge of the road, the City should be 
granted an easement over the property returned to Plaintiffs, for 
the purpose of maintaining that slope. (Tr. 47.) 
13. At the time of the resolution of this dispute, the 
parties understood that the Plaintiffs intended, at some point in 
time, to fill in the area between their home and the surface of 
the road, thereby obviating the need for the maintenance ease-
ment. Subsequently, in connection with Plaintiffs1 construction 
of a patient parking area and driveway off 300 North, Plaintiffs 
did, in fact, fill in the sloped area. 
14. In the Summer of 1983 the Plaintiffs desired to con-
struct the driveway from their new garage to Cedar Hills Drive 
and to place a fence along their property line as it adjoined 
Cedar Hills Drive and 300 North Streets. Plaintiffs were advised 
by various employees of the City that because the fence was more 
than four feet (41) in height, it would require a variance from 
the Board of Adjustment. Plaintiffs made appropriate application 
to the Board of Adjustment for a variance to build a six foot 
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(61) fence and were granted their application. However, before 
the fence could be constructed, the City, by and through the City 
Administrator, objected to the granted variance and brought the 
matter on for hearing before the City Council. 
15. At a meeting of the City Council held on September 28, 
1983, the City objected to the grant of variance for a six foot 
(61) fence. (Tr. 113.) A subsequent meeting of the City Council 
was held on October 12, 1983 to consider the objection of the 
City. At this subsequent meeting, the City Council directed the 
City Engineer, Mr. Gary Sonntag, to go to Plaintiffs' property 
and stake the right-of-way line so that the City Council could 
understand the proximity of the proposed fence to the right-of-
way and to Plaintiffs1 home and property. (R. 117.) 
16. Pursuant to the instructions of the City Council, the 
City Engineer was on the property of the Plaintiffs on October 
13, 1983. At that time the City Engineer reported to the Plain-
tiffs that he had calculated the distance between the right-of-
way line of Cedar Hills Drive and Plaintiffs' home to be thirty-
one feet (31') as opposed to the thirty-five feet (35') which had 
earlier been represented. (Tr. 117-18.) 
17. Based upon the measurements which were given to the 
Plaintiffs by the City Engineer, a drawing of the Plaintiffs1 
property showing the location of the residence, the location of 
the right-of-way and the position of the proposed fence, was 
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prepared by Plaintiffs and distributed to the members of the City 
Council. (Tr. 119.) 
18. At the time the City Engineer calculated the distance 
from the Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way, Plaintiffs had not 
commenced the construction of the proposed fence and had not 
commenced the construction of the driveway which would connect 
their new garage to Cedar Hills Drive. (Tr. 118-20.) 
19. On the Monday following the visit of the City Engineer 
to Plaintiffs1 property, the entire City Council, together with 
other key employees, visited the property in order to physically 
view the wooden stakes which the City Engineer had placed on the 
property showing the location of the right-of-way of Cedar Hills 
Drive. At that time the City Engineer confirmed to the City 
Council that the distance between the right-of-way and Plain-
tiffs' property was thirty-one feet (31f). (Tr. 121-22.) Based 
upon their view of the property, the City Council approved 
Plaintiffs' construction of a fence along the right-of-way line 
which had been designated by the City Engineer. (Tr. 123.) 
Written confirmation of this approval, together with a written 
plan showing the distance between the right-of-way and the house 
to be thirty-one feet (31'), was sent by the City Engineer to 
Plaintiffs. (Exh. 18.) 
20. Only after the distance between Plaintiffs' residence 
and the right-of-way was confirmed and established by the City 
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Engineer did the Plaintiffs begin construction of the fence and 
the driveway, 
21. Plaintiffs immediately commenced the construction of 
the driveway. The driveway consisted of reinforced concrete 
approximately twelve inches (12") in thickness which extended 
thirty feet (30') from the foundation of the garage to a point 
one foot (1') short of the right-of-way line established by the 
City. The driveway was sufficiently wide to accommodate the 
multiple car garage of the Plaintiffs, (Tr. 125-28.) The 
construction of the driveway was inspected periodically by the 
Price City Building Inspector, Mr. Taylor, and by the Price City 
Engineer, Mr. Sonntag. (Tr. 126.) Construction of the driveway 
was finished on November 5, 1983. (Tr. 129.) 
22. On September 22nd, 1984 Plaintiffs commenced con-
struction of the fence which had been approved by the City. The 
initial work done consisted of excavation for the footings and 
foundation of the fence columns. (Tr. 129-130.) 
23. However, before further work could be done on the 
fence, Plaintiffs received notice from the City that the work 
which had been done on the driveway and which was being done on 
the fence was within the right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive. The 
City notified Plaintiffs, for the first time, that a new survey 
had been completed and that the right-of-way line of Cedar Hills 
Drive was not thirty-one feet (31') from Plaintiffs' home, but 
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was now approximately ten feet (10') from Plaintiffs' home. (Tr. 
131; Exh. 19.) 
24. In accordance with this new information which the City 
claimed to have, it issued a stop work order against the Plain-
tiffs, resulting in the filing of this litigation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The arguments of Plaintiffs are simple and straight forward. 
First, Plaintiffs believe that the City, by virtue of a 
long-standing pattern of conduct on the part of authorized City 
employees, is estopped to claim that the right-of-way of Cedar 
Hills Drive is closer than thirty-one feet (31f) from the founda-
tion of Plaintiffs1 home. The corresponding argument is that, 
since Defendant is estopped, Plaintiff has not trespassed upon 
the right-of-way belonging to the City. Accordingly, the Trial 
Court erred in ruling that the Defendant was entitled to any 
damages by reason of said alleged trespass. It is, in fact, 
solely by reason of the estoppel of the Defendant that Plaintiffs 
find themselves having placed their improvements within the said 
right-of-way. 
Plaintiffs further assert that when the property along 300 
North Street was reconveyed to Plaintiffs by the City, the only 
purpose for which the City retained a fourteen foot (14') ease-
ment was to allow the City to maintain a severe slope which 
existed from the shoulder of 300 North Street down to Plaintiffs1 
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property. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in failing to rule 
that the easement should be terminated given the fact that the 
slope was filled in by Plaintiffs and no longer needed mainte-
nance by the City. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BARS THE CITY FROM CLAIMING 
THE RIGHT-OF-WAY OF CEDAR HILLS DRIVE TO BE CLOSER THAN 
THIRTY-ONE FEET FROM PLAINTIFFS' HOME. 
The main claim made by Plaintiffs is that the conduct, 
agreements and representations of the City as to the location of 
Cedar Hills Drive prohibits the City from enforcing a right-of-
way which is closer than thirty-one feet (31') from Plaintiffs1 
home. There can be no dispute that on a number of occasions the 
City made specific representations as to the location of the 
right-of-way and that the Plaintiffs acted in direct reliance 
upon those representations. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has increasingly been 
held to apply against governmental entities, including municipal-
ities. In 1982 this Court recognized that there exists a valid 
exception to the general rule that equitable estoppel will not 
apply to the government. 
In Utah State University. Etc. v. Sutro & Co., et. al», 646 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) the Supreme Court was dealing with a claim 
by stockbrokers that officials of the University had represented 
they had authority to trade in common stocks and that the brokers 
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had relied on those representations. In remanding the matter to 
the District Court, this Court held that there is a 
well-recognized exception under which the government is not 
shielded from a claim of estoppel. The Court stated: 
We have no doubt about the soundness nor the 
salutary purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is 
not assertable against the government or governmental 
institutions. . . . Notwithstanding our approval of 
that rule, like most general rules, there are ex-
ceptions when its rigid application would defeat, 
rather than serve, the higher purpose that all rules 
are intended to serve: that of doing justice• . . . 
When it is plainly apparent that its application would 
result in injustice, and there would be no substantial 
adverse affect on public policy, the Courts will honor 
the higher purpose of doing justice by invoking the 
exception, rather than departing from that desired 
objective in slavish adherence to a general rule. Id. 
at 718. 
This Court, in Utah State University, then noted a United 
States Federal Court case in which the exception has been ap-
plied. At page 719 the Justice Crockett observed: 
Another case which we regard as helpful and 
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of 
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, [481 F. 2d 985 (1973)]. 
After reviewing the case law the Court stated that 
estoppel should be allowed as a defense against the 
government where to do otherwise would work a serious 
injustice, and the public interest would not be unduly 
damaged by the interposition of that defense. In its 
discussion, the Court engaged in what has been referred 
to as a "balancing of equities" test and concluded that 
under the facts of that case a grave injustice would 
result if the government were not held responsible for 
the information it had given the Ranch and which the 
latter had relied on . . . . 
Other cases highlight the circumstances under which estoppel 
may be applied against the government. In Celebrity Club, Inc. 
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v, Utah Liquor Control Commission/ 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) this 
Court stated that the government was estopped to deny a license 
to a club within 600 feet of a school where the Commission had 
represented that the location was in compliance on more than one 
occasion and the owners had incurred substantial expense in 
reliance upon the Commission. 
Furthermore/ in Town of Boulder v. Bullock/ 632 P. 2d 716 
(Mont* 1981) the owner of property, after obtaining proper 
permits from the City, constructed a home and office building 
which encroached upon a City right-of-way. The Montana Supreme 
Court applied the exception and barred the City from enjoining 
the encroachment. 
The case at hand falls squarely within the body of caselaw 
represented by the above citations. For the City to be equitably 
estopped, Plaintiffs must only show that the application of 
estoppel is 1) supported by representations reasonably relied 
upon; 2) without the estoppel substantial injustice would result; 
and 3) the granting of estoppel would not adversely affect public 
policy. Under the undisputed facts presented to the Trial Court/ 
the Plaintiffs more than meet these requirements. 
The number of times, as shown by the evidence/ that Plain-
tiffs were misled by officials of the Cityf acting in their 
official capacities/ is most disturbing. The Plaintiffs have 
been the unknowing victims of numerous representations by the 
City as to the distance between their home and Cedar Hills Drive. 
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The representation of thirty feet (30') was made when the 
City Engineer first marked the setback requirement for the 
constructions of Plaintiffs' foundation. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiffs built their home beyond the stakes set by the City 
Engineer, and thereafter believed that their house was 
thirty-five feet (35') from the right-of-way. Again, in 1983, 
the City specifically, and with specific intent, represented to 
Plaintiffs that the right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive was some 
thirty-one feet (31') from their home. Only after the City had 
located the right-of-way line, and only after the City, by and 
through the City Council had given specific approval to that 
line, did Plaintiffs commence significant improvements to their 
property. Before the City stopped the work, Plaintiffs, with the 
full knowledge and approval of the City, had constructed a large 
concrete driveway which extended from their new garage out to the 
right-of-way line which had been represented by the City. In 
addition, Plaintiffs purchased the materials for and commenced 
the construction of their fence, again at the right-of-way line 
indicated by the City. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs had nothing to do with 
the establishment of the thirty-one foot (31') measurement. The 
testimony was clear that Plaintiffs only knew of that particular 
distance when told them by the City Engineer. Until then 
Plaintiffs thought the distance to be thirty-five feet (351). 
-15-
The Trial Court simply erred in not finding that Plaintiffs 
had relied to their detriment upon the representations of the 
City. The reliance is obvious, open and direct. The detriment, 
in the form of substantial expenditures in improvements is, 
likewise, open, obvious and direct. The detriment is even more 
appalling when one considers the fact that the Trial Court 
entered judgment against the Plaintiffs for the supposed cost of 
removing those very improvements which the Plaintiffs had placed 
on the property after the City told them where the right-of-way 
line was. 
POINT II. 
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR TRESPASS 
IS CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE. 
Admittedly, the ruling of the Court granting the City a 
judgment for the supposed trespass of the Plaintiffs is a natural 
outgrowth of the finding that the City was not estopped. In 
other words, the Trial Court would naturally conclude that the 
City was entitled to the cost of removing improvements placed in 
the right-of-way area by the Plaintiffs if it concluded that the 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to those improvements. By the same 
token, the argument that the Trial Court erred in entering such 
judgment is a natural outgrowth of a ruling in favor of 
Plaintiffs. 
The ruling of the Court was simply that since the City was 
not estopped to claim that the right-of-way was a bare ten feet 
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(10') from Plaintiffs' home, the City was, therefore, entitled to 
the cost of removing those improvements which had been placed in 
the area belonging to the City. Strangely, the fact that the 
City would be entitled to such a judgment if the City was not 
estopped, is further evidence that estoppel must apply. It is 
nothing short of ludicrous to argue that the City can allow, if 
not instruct, a landowner to place improvements on property and 
then to obtain a judgment against the landowner when the City 
determines that the improvements have been placed, mistakenly, on 
its property. 
POINT III. 
THE RESERVATION OF AN EASEMENT SHOULD TERMINATE. 
The last issue raised by Plaintiffs relates to the reserva-
tion by the City of a fourteen foot (14') easement over the 
property of Plaintiffs as it abuts 300 North Street. Plaintiffs 
contend that at the time of the reservation there existed a 
substantial slope on 300 North down into the property of Plain-
tiffs. Thus, there was a single and salutary purpose for the 
easement, to wit: the need for constant maintenance of the 
slope. However, when the slope was filled in by the Plaintiffs 
with the consent of the City, the need for a fourteen foot (14f) 
easement disappeared. Since it was the clear intention of the 
parties to solve a maintenance problem, the property of the 
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Plaintiffs should no longer be encumbered by such a large 
easement. 
The law with respect to reformation of a deed is clear. In 
Haslam v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984) this Court, in 
allowing the reformation of a Warranty Deed, cited with approval, 
the following language from §619 of Corbin On Contracts: 
If two parties are in clear agreement as to the 
factual and legal result that they wish to accomplish, 
and a deed or other document is drawn by a scrivener 
using words that do not produce that result, the case 
is a proper one for reformation of the instrument . . . 
it makes no difference whether this is called a mistake 
of fact or a mistake of law or a mistake of both 
together. With respect to the legal effect of the 
words, the two parties no doubt make the same mistake 
that the scrivener made; and they make it because they 
relied on him. Ld. at 30. 
See also, Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980); Bound v. 
Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984); Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1984) . 
The facts presented to the Trial Court indicate that the 
only intention of the parties when the reservation of easement 
was made was to allow the City a method by which it could main-
tain the property. The City did not argue, at Trial, that it had 
another purpose for reserving to itself an easement of fourteen 
feet (14f) in front of the home of the Plaintiffs. Indeed, no 
expert testimony was introduced to show that the City had any 
legitimate need for fourteen feet (14f) after the slope was 
filled in. 
-18-
The mutual mistake of the parties was their failure to place 
language which would limit the use of the easement to maintenance 
of the slope. Such mistake is the proper subject of reformation. 
Accordingly/ the Trial Court erred in failing to rule that since 
the intention of the parties was to maintain a slope which no 
longer existed/ the need for the easement likewise should 
terminate. 
CONCLUSION 
A more appropriate circumstance for the imposition of the 
doctrine of estoppel is hard to imagine. Plaintiffs have done 
nothing more than to rely upon the specific and intentional 
representations of the municipality of which they are residents. 
This is not a case where Plaintiffs could or should have done 
something more to protect themselves. The City went to great 
lengths to tell Plaintiffs where the right-of-way line was. When 
those representations were made by the City, it knew, through its 
agents including the City Council, that Plaintiffs intended to 
undertake specific and costly improvements to their property as a 
result of the representations made. 
The injustice caused by this whole scenario is shocking. 
Plaintiffs built their home believing that it was a comfortable 
distance from the street/ only to find out/ years later, that the 
City Engineer was wrong and that a major City thoroughfare was 
barely ten feet (10f) from their door. 
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Later, Plaintiffs were specifically told by the City Engi-
neer, in a meeting with the City Council on the property, which 
was convened for that very purpose, that the right-of-way line 
was thirty-one feet (31') from their home. The City, again, knew 
that Plaintiffs intended to undertake substantial and expensive 
improvements to their property. Plaintiffs spent substantial 
sums on a cement driveway and approach to Cedar Hills Drive, as 
well as the commencement of fence construction, only to be told 
by the Trial Court that, for their trouble, Plaintiffs would have 
to pay the City to remove those very improvements which were 
placed on the property with the City's knowledge. Once more, the 
City had to admit that it had made a terrible mistake, but one 
which it declined to do anything about. 
In similar fashion, the City agreed to give back to Plain-
tiffs that very property which Plaintiffs had been required to 
give to the City originally for the building of 300 North Street. 
The City had simply failed to build the road on the property 
which it required Terry's to give. In that transaction the City 
required Plaintiffs to encumber their property with a fourteen 
foot (14') easement for the purposes of maintenance of an 
unusually steep slope. Plaintiffs were only too happy to give 
that easement because of the slope. However, all parties under-
stood that absent such a slope, no such encumbrance would be 
necessary. Nevertheless, the City refuses to terminate an 
easement which is clearly excessive and unnecessary. 
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A patent injustice has occurred. Plaintiffs met their 
burden before the Trial Court; yet the injustice continues. It 
is respectfully submitted that the law of estoppel clearly 
applies, that the Trial Court erred in holding otherwise and that 
the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
Dated this 5th day of December, 1988. 
POOLE & SMITH 
DUANET*. SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
TERRYAPPEALBRF/ 
PLEAD9 
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